Last couple of governments made headlines for declaring that appointments of the chiefs of public enterprises would be made through a free competition. Going a step further, present government opened˜tenders even for the constitutional positions like the chief and other commissioners for the Election Commission, Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) and Public Service Commission.

At the face, it appeared as a welcome idea as those crucial institutions could now expect to be headed by the most talented professionals than the political cronies of the party in power. Some of the selection process, like for the Executive Director of Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), at the beginning appeared reasonably fair. The erstwhile government made the appointment on the basis of that very selection. Even the present government has appointed in couple of positions by calling for applications, like in case of the Chairman of Securities Board of Nepal (SEBON).

However, status of application collected for constitutional bodies is yet in the dark. But, as it turned out now, all these so called free competitions were mere hoax. Ultimately, only hardcore cadres of the ruling party are getting appointment. The new NEA Executive Director turned out to be a devout UML party worker and Chairman of SEBON a staunch Maoist supporter. In both cases of NEA and SEBON, there were more qualified persons than those who were lucky enough to be picked for the job. But those PhD degree holders and true professionals were summarily discarded.

Then, why is there drama of free competition as the people in power were freely appointing their near and dear ones in these positions for years? Because, this has several advantages for both the appointee and the appointer. Generally, such government appointments are made with a clause for maximum of (so many) years if it is a political appointment as in the past. But the person who is selected through free competition  has a negotiation power not only on tenure but also for the perks. Then it has two advantages. First, the chosen cadre will have a fixed term appointment instead of uncertain maximum of. Second, he can bargain for better pay than the normal effective government pay-scale. In turn, the appointing party also can bargain for the appointee's contribution mostly monetary, called levyâ.

What is important here is not the process but the intent of the appointer. If their intentions are to appoint the best professional, the free competition for mere publicity is an unnecessary waste of time and resources. On the contrary, if the ruling parties want their own cadres in any pretext, the so called free competition will only add to the worries of public enterprises, most of which are already in precarious situation.